LG Energy Solution makes rechargeable battery cells — cells built to be charged and used again rather than thrown away after one use — for electric vehicles, energy storage systems, IT devices, power tools and light electric vehicles. It is listed on the KOSPI, the main board of Korea Exchange, under ticker 373220.
You cannot buy its product in a shop. The cells go inside somebody else’s finished product, which means the company’s customers are the carmakers and device makers that build those products, not consumers.
The numbers in its FY2025 annual report do not all point the same way. Operating profit rose sharply while revenue, net income and the company’s own disclosed world share of EV batteries all fell. That mix is the reason the useful question about this company is not how much it earned, but who places the orders.
LG ENERGY SOLUTION, LTD. (엘지에너지솔루션) · KRX: 373220 · KOSPI
Won amounts are converted at ₩1,338.2 per US dollar (Bank of Korea ECOS, KRW/USD base rate, 2026-09-11) for scale only.
What the company makes, and whose product it ends up in
The company researches, develops and manufactures battery products used in electric vehicles (EV), energy storage systems (ESS — large installed batteries that take in electricity and release it later), IT devices, power tools and light electric vehicles (LEV).
Its Energy Solution division lists three main products: batteries for EVs, batteries for ESS, and batteries for small applications.
Making these cells is an engineering business rather than a consumer one. The company’s annual report describes the industry as requiring chemical, electrical and mechanical engineering — the blending of materials including cathode material, anode material and electrolyte, and the structural design of electrodes and of the battery cell itself.
The performance elements the report ties to end-user needs are energy density, output, charging time, low-temperature behaviour and safety. Those are the specifications a buyer of cells argues about.
The report also states that developing battery technology for a sustainable future is the company’s core strategy, and that in part of its business the company delivers according to the production plans of the automakers it supplies. That last line is the structural fact the rest of this article keeps returning to.
All the filing figures here come from the company’s annual report submitted to DART, Korea’s electronic disclosure system operated by the Financial Supervisory Service, where Korean listed companies file their reports in full.
Its own filed share of the world’s EV batteries, across three periods
Korean filings number fiscal years in sequence from a company’s incorporation rather than by calendar year, so the annual report calls its years the fourth, fifth and sixth fiscal periods. With a December year-end, those are FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025, and the company disclosed an EV battery world market share for each.
The annual report shows 13.6% for FY2023, 10.8% for FY2024 and 9.2% for FY2025. Read in order, the share fell in each year.
The figure is not the company’s own count. The report gives SNE Research as the data source and states the share is measured against the world market — that is, how much of the EV battery volume sold worldwide in a year was this company’s, as counted by an outside research firm.
The report also dates the oldest of the three: the FY2023 share is an annual cumulative figure prepared from SNE Research data of January 2024.
Who holds the rest of that world market is a separate question, and the filings cited here do not show it. What the filings do say is that supply volume is fluid — it moves with customers’ actual orders and with future market conditions.
Operating profit up, net income down, in the same statements
The figures below are consolidated — the parent company and its subsidiaries combined into one set of statements. Korean filings also carry separate (standalone) figures for the parent alone, and the two sets can differ substantially.
On a consolidated basis, FY2025 revenue was KRW 23.67 trillion (about $17.69 billion), against KRW 25.62 trillion (about $19.14 billion) in FY2024.
Operating profit went the other way, rising to KRW 1.35 trillion (about $1.01 billion) from KRW 575.4 billion (about $430 million) — more than double.
Net income did not follow it. It came in at KRW 80.8 billion (about $60 million), against KRW 338.6 billion (about $253 million) in FY2024. So a headline about a swing in profit and a headline about shrinking earnings can both be describing this same report, one line apart.
Total assets over the same comparison rose to KRW 67.15 trillion (about $50.18 billion) from KRW 60.31 trillion (about $45.07 billion). The filings cited here do not show, item by item, what happened between the operating line and the bottom line.
On the balance-sheet pressure, according to Korean media reports, borrowings grew quickly as the company expanded, and its capital expenditure runs above EBITDA — meaning it spends more on building plants than its operations generate in cash.
Those same reports carry a Korean credit rating agency’s warning on credit risk in the secondary battery industry: the industry’s swing into the black, in its view, is not a structural improvement.
The used-battery pilot, and the boxes the coverage leaves empty
Alongside the vehicle business, the company has an EaaS business unit inside its ESS division — a sign that storage is being sold as a service, not only as hardware.
According to Korean media reports, the company is taking part in a demonstration project with Hyundai Motor, Kia, Hyundai Engineering and Wonik PNE that puts used EV batteries to work as energy storage. The batteries are used packs from Hyundai Motor Group’s E-GMP platform, and the site is Hwaseong, Gyeonggi Province.
The build is a UBESS — a storage system assembled from used battery packs — of 200kWh in total, connected to an EV fast charger. The stated purpose is to store power in the used batteries and then draw on it for fast charging, confirming whether the batteries can be reused, and to spread out the electrical load at fast-charging stations, where demand arrives in concentrated bursts.
The roles are split. The same reports say LG Energy Solution builds the UBESS from packs supplied by Hyundai Motor and Kia and, drawing on its battery diagnosis and operation capability, supports verification of the system’s performance and safety. Hyundai Motor and Kia pursue the technical validation and the business model; Hyundai Engineering examines commercial viability in a real operating environment and whether it can be linked to charging infrastructure rollout.
What the material cited here does not contain is as telling as what it does: no duration for the demonstration, no threshold for how much capacity a battery must retain to qualify, and no figure for whether the value of the stored electricity exceeds what it costs to install and run the system.
Until those boxes are filled in, the cited material does not allow a reader to separate a demonstration from a business. They are the lines to look for in the next report on it.
Who decides how much it builds
The annual report is explicit about the mechanism. In part of its business the company delivers to automakers’ production plans, and its supply volume moves with customers’ actual orders and with future market conditions.
That puts the first variable outside the company. How many cells it ships depends less on what it announces than on how many electric vehicles its customers decide to build.
The second variable is how far batteries spread outside the car — the ESS, IT device, power tool and light-electric-vehicle applications the report lists, and the storage-as-a-service unit it has staffed.
Whether that overall market grows or shrinks from here is not something the material cited in this article answers. There is no third-party market forecast in it, and this article does not supply one.
Frequently asked questions
Q. Where can I read these filings myself, and what does the fiscal period numbering mean?
A. Korean listed companies file through DART, the electronic disclosure system operated by the Financial Supervisory Service. The annual report referenced here was filed on 2026-03-12. Korean reports label fiscal years by sequence from incorporation — fourth, fifth, sixth period — rather than by calendar year, so the labels have to be matched to years. In the annual report used here, the sixth period is FY2025.
Q. Are the revenue and profit figures consolidated or standalone?
A. The figures in this article are consolidated: the parent and its subsidiaries combined. Korean filings also present separate (standalone) statements covering the parent company alone, and for a group with overseas manufacturing the two sets are not interchangeable — check which basis a headline is using before comparing it with another.
Q. Who calculated the EV battery market share, and on what basis?
A. The company’s annual report gives SNE Research as the source and states the measurement is against the world market. The report also dates the oldest of the three disclosed shares: the FY2023 figure is an annual cumulative number prepared from SNE Research data of January 2024.
Q. Is the second-life battery project a real revenue line?
A. The material cited here does not allow that call. According to Korean media reports the demonstration is a 200kWh system built from used E-GMP packs in Hwaseong, Gyeonggi Province, connected to an EV fast charger, with the company building the system and supporting performance and safety verification. No demonstration period, no minimum remaining-capacity standard and no cost-versus-revenue figure appear in that coverage.
Q. If I want to track this company, what should I actually watch?
A. The filings say supply volume follows automakers’ production plans and customers’ actual orders, and moves with market conditions. That points the reader toward how many electric vehicles the company’s customers are building, and toward whether battery demand widens into the non-automotive applications the report lists, rather than toward the company’s own announcements.
Sources
- https://dart.fss.or.kr/dsaf001/main.do?rcpNo=20260312000217
- https://www.ksilbo.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1067003
- http://www.beyondpost.co.kr/view.php?ud=202609102308472847be44c0aacd_30
- https://www.pinpointnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=485967
- https://www.lcnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=208102
- http://digitalchosun.dizzo.com/site/data/html_dir/2026/09/10/2026091080188.html
- https://news.tf.co.kr/read/economy/2364588.htm
- https://www.todayeconomic.com/news/article.html?no=32078
- https://www.epnc.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=406809
- http://www.lkp.news/news/articleView.html?idxno=83943
- https://www.pointdaily.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=318836
- https://www.ebn.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1723811
This article explains company filings and published figures for information only. It is not investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Figures can change after publication — check the original filings before making decisions.